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Risk aversionA monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk
aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here,
we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a ﬁrm and
its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of
competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is deﬁned endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes
her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously deﬁned, the impact of uncertainty is
ambiguous.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Due to the deregulation of many sectors of the economy, e.g.,
energy and telecommunications, investment decisions should con-
sider not only market uncertainty but also competition. Simulta-
neously, more stringent environmental regulation is likely to
promote investment in alternative energy technologies. For exam-
ple, BrightSource Energy, a company based in California, has signed
the world’s two largest deals to build new solar-power capacity
and will begin constructing a series of 14 solar power plants that
will collectively supply more than 2.6 gigawatts (GW) of electricity
(The Economist, 2009). While solar-thermal power stations have
several advantages over solar-photovoltaic projects, as they are
typically built on a much larger scale and historically have lower
costs, thin-ﬁlm solar-cell modules are rapidly falling in price and,
in some situations, can generate electricity more cheaply than so-
lar-thermal power. As a result, competition from photovoltaic sys-
tems for large-scale power generation is expected to be signiﬁcant.
Apart from facing competition and uncertain energy prices, ﬁrms
undertaking investments in such alternative energy technologies
are also likely to be more risk averse since they face technical risk
that cannot be diversiﬁed. Indeed, with such projects, the underly-
ing commodities are often not freely traded in order to allow theconstruction of a replicating portfolio. Consequently, the assump-
tion of hedging via spanning assets breaks down, and risk-neutral
valuation is not possible.
Although canonical real options theory ﬁnds particular applica-
tion in such sectors as it facilitates the analysis of capital budget-
ing, its treatment of such decision-making problems has mainly
been in a monopoly or a perfect competition setting, while recent
work considering a duopolistic setting has assumed risk neutrality.
In this paper, we extend the traditional real options approach to
strategic decision making under uncertainty by examining how
duopolistic competition affects the entry of a risk-averse ﬁrm.
We consider two identical ﬁrms that are risk averse and hold an
option each to invest in a project that yields stochastic revenues.
Since the two ﬁrms operate in the same industry, investment deci-
sions of one ﬁrm impact the revenues of both ﬁrms. We analyse
two settings: pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive competition. In
the former, both ﬁrms have the incentive to invest in order to ob-
tain a leader advantage, while in the latter, the role of the leader is
assigned exogenously. Although in the absence of asymmetries,
pre-emptive competition may be more common, nevertheless,
non-pre-emptive competition may also arise in many cases, e.g.,
a particular technology or company may receive governmental
support and, thus, has a competitive advantage over less favoured
ones. Recently, both regulators and government have promoted
EDF in its pursuit to build offshore wind plants over rivals even
though its installed wind capacity by 2010 was only 10% of
France’s overall level (Bloomberg, 2012). Thus, these two settings
capture extremes in terms of government involvement in industry.
For each setting, we analyse the impact of uncertainty and risk
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competing ﬁrms and examine the degree to which the presence
of a competitor impacts the entry of a risk-averse ﬁrm. Hence,
the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we develop a the-
oretical framework for analysing investment under uncertainty
and risk aversion for pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive duopolies
in order to derive closed-form expressions (where possible) for
the optimal investment thresholds. Second, we quantify the degree
to which competition impacts the strategic investment decisions of
a risk-averse ﬁrm. Finally, we provide managerial insights for
investment decisions and relative ﬁrm values under each setting
based on analytical and numerical results.
We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2 and
formulate the problems in Section 3. In Section 4, we solve the
problems and analyse the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion
on the optimal investment timing decisions of the two competing
ﬁrms in each setting. In Section 5, we provide numerical examples
for each case in order to examine the effects of volatility and risk
aversion on the optimal investment timing decisions and quantify
the degree to which the entry of a risk-averse ﬁrm is affected by
the presence of a rival. We also illustrate the interaction between
risk aversion and uncertainty and present managerial insights to
enable more informed investment decisions. Section 6 concludes
by summarising the results and offering directions for future
research.2. Related work
The majority of real options models tackle the problem of opti-
mal investment timing without considering competition (McDon-
ald & Siegel, 1985, 1986), while the ones that do, assume risk
neutrality (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). In the area of competition,
Smets (1993) ﬁrst combined real options valuation techniques
with game theory concepts, thus developing a continuous-time
model of strategic real option exercise under product market com-
petition, assuming that entry is irreversible, demand is stochastic,
and simultaneous investment occurs only when the role of the lea-
der is deﬁned exogenously. Huisman and Kort (1999) examine how
the deterministic duopoly framework of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) is affected when uncertainty is introduced. According to
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), under high ﬁrst-mover advantages,
a pre-emption equilibrium occurs with dispersed adoption timings
since it is essential for each ﬁrm to move quickly and pre-empt
investment by its rivals. The introduction of uncertainty creates
an opposing force since now there is a positive option value of
waiting that increases with uncertainty, thereby increasing the re-
quired investment threshold. Indeed, although in deterministic
models, high ﬁrst-mover advantage leads to a pre-emptive equilib-
rium, in the stochastic case, increasing output-price uncertainty
raises the required entry threshold for both ﬁrms as it increases
the value of waiting. Finally, if ﬁrst-mover advantages are lower
but sufﬁciently large for the pre-emptive equilibrium to result in
the deterministic model, then sufﬁciently high uncertainty results
in simultaneous investment equilibrium (Huisman & Kort, 1999;
Thijssen, Huisman, & Kort, 2012). Consequently, the introduction
of uncertainty reduces the number of scenarios in which the pre-
emptive equilibrium prevails.
Weeds (2002) considers irreversible investment in competing
research projects with uncertain returns under a winner-takes-all
patent system. The technological success of the project is probabi-
listic, while the economic value of the patent to be won evolves
stochastically over time. Her results indicate that in a pre-emptive
leader–follower equilibrium, ﬁrms invest sequentially and option
values are reduced by competition. However, a symmetric out-
come may also occur in which investment is more delayed thanthe single-ﬁrm counterpart. Comparing this with the optimal coop-
erative investment pattern, investment is found to be more de-
layed when ﬁrms act non-cooperatively as each holds back from
investing in the fear of starting a patent race.
Paxson and Pinto (2005) extend the traditional real options ap-
proach by presenting a rivalry model in which the proﬁts per unit
and the number of units sold are both stochastic variables but
captured via an aggregate variable. They examine a pre-emptive
setting (where both ﬁrms ﬁght for the leader’s position) and a
non-pre-emptive setting (where the role of the leader is deﬁned
exogenously). Their results indicate that the triggers of both the
leader and the follower increase in both settings as the correlation
between the proﬁts per unit and the quantity of units increases
since then the aggregate volatility involving the number of units
and the proﬁts per unit also increases. Furthermore, they illustrate
how a marginal increase in the number of units sold while the ac-
tive leader is alone in the market increases the value of the active
leader by more than the value of her investment opportunity. Since
the extra beneﬁt from delaying investment is less than that from
the active project, the non-pre-emptive leader’s incentive to invest
increases, thereby reducing the discrepancy between the pre-emp-
tive leader’s and non-pre-emptive leader’s entry thresholds. Final-
ly, they illustrate how increasing ﬁrst-mover advantages create an
incentive for the pre-emptive leader to enter the market sooner
since then the entry of the follower is less damaging.
Unlike earlier studies concerning investment strategies in the
electricity market, Takashima, Goto, Kimura, and Madarame
(2008) assess the effect of competition on market entry and the
strategies of ﬁrms with asymmetric technologies. They analyse
the entry strategies into the electricity market of two ﬁrms that
have power plants under price uncertainty and consider ﬁrms with
either a thermal power plant or a nuclear power plant. Among
other results, they show that for a nuclear power plant, the entry
threshold of the leader is higher compared to a liquiﬁed natural
gas thermal power plant since the latter has mothballing options
that facilitate investment. Also, compared to the ﬁrm with a coal
power plant or an oil thermal power plant, a ﬁrm with a nuclear
power plant tends to be the leader because variable and construc-
tion costs for a nuclear power plant are lower compared to those of
a coal power plant, while the oil thermal power plant may have
lower construction costs but has variable costs that are twice as
much as those of the nuclear power plant. An extension to asym-
metric information over revenues ﬁnds that an equilibrium may
not occur (Graham, 2011).
Huisman and Kort (2009) model not only the timing but also the
size of the investment. They consider a monopoly setting as well as
a duopoly setting and compare the results with the standard mod-
els in which the ﬁrms do not have capacity choice. They show how
at a given level of demand, the leader can deter the entry of the
follower temporarily by installing a capacity level such that the fol-
lower’s entry is proﬁtable at higher levels of demand. Moreover, the
leader can choose the deterrence strategy only up to a certain high
level of demand, above which it is optimal for the follower to enter
at the same time as the leader. Similarly, if the demand is low, then
it is not optimal for the leader to choose the deterrence strategy as
this would result in negative proﬁts. The region in which the leader
can choose either one of the two strategies decreases with uncer-
tainty, thereby increasing the range of demand in which the leader
chooses the deterrence strategy. Finally, discretion over capacity
becomesmore valuable at high levels of uncertainty since then, un-
like the model with ﬁxed capacity, the optimal strategy for the lea-
der is to invest at a lower demand level and install higher capacity,
while the follower’s optimal strategy is to invest at a higher demand
level and install greater capacity.
Extending the traditional approach that considers only two
competing ﬁrms, Bouis, Huisman, and Kort (2009) analyse
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petitors are present. In the setting including three ﬁrms, they ﬁnd
that if entry of the third ﬁrm is delayed, then the second ﬁrm has
an incentive to invest earlier because this ﬁrm can enjoy the duop-
oly market structure for a longer time. This reduces the investment
incentive for the ﬁrst ﬁrm, which now faces a shorter period in
which it can enjoy monopoly proﬁts, and, thus, it invests later. This
ﬁnding is denoted as the accordion effect and is also observed
when the number of competing ﬁrms is greater. Indeed, with more
than three ﬁrms competing, exogenous demand changes affect the
timing of entry of the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth, etc., investor in the same
qualitative way, while the entry of the second, fourth, sixth, etc.,
investor is affected in exactly the opposite qualitative way. In other
words, if a delay is observed for the ‘‘odd’’ investors, then the
‘‘even’’ investors will invest sooner. Also, in an oligopolistic frame-
work, Roques and Savva (2009) explore the effect of a price cap on
capacity expansion under uncertainty. However, they assume that
no new ﬁrm will enter the industry.
Each of these papers assumes a risk-neutral decision maker,
and, as a result, the implications of risk aversion, which may be rel-
evant for reasons of market incompleteness or the presence of
undiversiﬁable risk, are not addressed. We contribute to this line
of work by developing a utility-based framework in order to exam-
ine how optimal investment decisions under uncertainty are af-
fected by competition and risk aversion. This is relevant, for
example, for a knowledge-based sector in which ﬁrms compete
to launch a new product whose technical risk cannot be diversiﬁed.
In order to describe the preferences of the two ﬁrms, we use a con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and determine
the optimal strategies that maximise the expected utility of their
future proﬁts in both pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive settings.
Such a utility-based framework was ﬁrst introduced to real options
by Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), who extend the work of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) by illustrating
how risk aversion affects investment under uncertainty when the
decision maker faces incomplete markets. Instead of using contin-
gent claims, they use an optimal stopping time approach to allow
for the decision maker’s risk aversion to be incorporated via a CRRA
utility function. Their framework is based on a closed-form expres-
sion for the expected discounted utility of stochastic cash ﬂows de-
rived by Karatzas and Shreve (1999). This approach is extended by
Chronopoulos, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011) in order to examine
the impact of operational ﬂexibility, i.e., the ability to suspend
and resume the project at any time, on optimal investment policies
and option values assuming a risk-averse decision maker. They ﬁnd
that although risk aversion deters investment and hastens aban-
donment, the inclusion of embedded options, e.g., to suspend the
project with subsequent resumption, may delay suspension. A sim-
ilarly counterintuitive result appears in Miao and Wang (2007) in
the context of a real-estate developer that hastens its sale of a plot
of land due to risk aversion in order to lock in the lump-sum value
of the property. Finally, Henderson and Hobson (2002) extend the
real options approach to pricing and hedging assets by taking the
perspective of a risk-averse decision maker facing incomplete mar-
kets, while Henderson (2007) investigates the impact of risk aver-
sion and incompleteness on investment timing and option value by
a risk-averse decision maker with an exponential utility function
who can choose at any time to undertake an irreversible invest-
ment project and receive a risky payoff.
Our work does not address embedded options or hedging but,
rather, focuses on the interaction between competition and risk
aversion. We ﬁnd that the entry of the leader and the follower is
delayed due to risk aversion in both pre-emptive and non-pre-
emptive settings and that, relative to the monopolist, the non-
pre-emptive leader is hurt less from the follower’s entry than the
pre-emptive leader since the former has the ﬂexibility to delayentry into the market. Interestingly, the loss in the pre-emptive
leader’s value, relative to that of a monopolist, due to the follower’s
entry is not affected by risk aversion; by contrast, the non-pre-
emptive leader is relatively better off with greater risk aversion.
Furthermore, we show that higher uncertainty reduces the loss
in value of the pre-emptive leader relative to the monopolist by
delaying the entry of the follower, thereby allowing the pre-emp-
tive leader to enjoy monopoly proﬁts for longer time. Although
we would expect this result to extend to the non-pre-emptive set-
ting, we ﬁnd that, depending on the discrepancy in market share,
the non-pre-emptive leader may actually become worse off with
increasing uncertainty. This seemingly counterintuitive result
holds because a high discrepancy in market share makes the in-
crease in option value less profound as it increases the ﬁrst-mover
advantage and, at the same time, increases the impact of the fol-
lower’s entry, thereby making the non-pre-emptive leader worse
off. Conversely, if the discrepancy between the market share of
the leader and the follower is low, then the impact of uncertainty
on the leader’s option value is more profound and offsets the loss
in value due to the follower’s entry.
3. Problem formulation
3.1. Assumptions and notation
Assume that each ﬁrm incurs an investment cost, K, in order to
start a project that produces output forever. Time is continuous
and denoted by t, and the revenue received from the project at
time t P 0 is Rt ¼ PtDðQtÞ ($/annum). Here, Qt denotes the number
of ﬁrms in the industry, i.e., Qt ¼ 0;1;2, and DðQtÞ is a strictly
decreasing function reﬂecting the quantity demanded from each
ﬁrm per annum. We assume that the price per unit of the project’s
output, Pt , follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dPt ¼ lPtdt þ rPtdZt ; P0 > 0 ð1Þ
where lP 0 is the growth rate of Pt;rP 0 is the volatility of Pt ,
and dZt is the increment of the standard Brownian motion. Also,
we denote by r P 0 the risk-free rate and by qP l the subjective
discount rate. Let sji be the random time at which ﬁrm j; j ¼ ‘; f
(denoting leader or follower, respectively), enters the industry given
market structure i ¼ m;p;n (denoting monopoly, pre-emptive
duopoly, or non-pre-emptive duopoly, respectively), i.e.,
sji min t P 0 : Pt P Psj
i
n o
ð2Þ
where Psj
i
is the corresponding output price. Finally, we denote by
Fsj
i
ðP0Þ the expected value of ﬁrm j’s investment opportunity under
market structure i that is exercised at time sji and by V
j
iðP0Þ the ex-
pected NPV of ﬁrm j given the initial output price, P0.
In order to account for risk aversion, we assume that the prefer-
ences of both ﬁrms are described by an identical increasing and
concave utility function, UðÞ. In our analysis, we apply a CRRA util-
ity function, which is deﬁned in (3), and assume that the risk aver-
sion parameter c 2 ½0;1Þ. Although our analysis can accommodate
a wide range of utility functions, such as hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), in this
paper we focus on CRRA and leave the analysis related to other
utility functions for further research.
UðPtÞ ¼
P1ct
1c if cP 0 & c – 1
lnðPtÞ if c ¼ 1
(
ð3Þ
3.2. Monopoly
We begin by formulating the problem for the case of monopoly,
where a single ﬁrm starts a perpetually operating project at a
Fig. 2. Discounted utility from investment under risk aversion for a pre-emptive
duopoly.
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free bond and earns an instantaneous cash ﬂow of rK per time unit
with utility UðrKÞ discounted at her subjective rate of time prefer-
ence, q. At sjm, when the output price is Psjm , the monopolist swaps
this risk-free cash ﬂow for a risky one, PtDð1Þ, with utility
UðPtDð1ÞÞ as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The conditional expected utility of the cash ﬂows discounted to
time t ¼ 0 is:
EP0
Z sjm
0
eqtUðrKÞdt þ
Z 1
sjm
eqtUðPtDð1ÞÞdt
" #
¼
Z 1
0
eqtUðrKÞdt þ EP0
Z 1
sjm
eqt ½UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞdt ð4Þ
where EP0 denotes the expectation operator, which is conditional on
the initial value of the price process and reﬂects the randomness of
both s1 and Pt . Due to the law of iterated expectations and the
strong Markov property
EP0
Z 1
sjm
eqt½UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞdt ¼ EP0 eqs
j
m
h i
Vjm Psjm
 
ð5Þ
where
Vjm Psjm
 
¼ EP
sjm
Z 1
0
eqt ½UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞdt
 
ð6Þ
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to sjm,
and the monopolist’s objective is to maximise the discounted ex-
pected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, i.e., EP0 e
qsjm
h i
Vjm Psjm
 
.
3.3. Duopoly
3.3.1. Pre-emptive duopoly
We extend the previous framework by adding one more ﬁrm to
the industry. As there are two ﬁrms in the industry ﬁghting for the
leader’s position, each one of them runs the risk of pre-emption,
which reduces the value of waiting. The ﬁrm that enters the mar-
ket ﬁrst is the leader, and the ﬁrm that enters second is the fol-
lower as shown in Fig. 2.
Consequently, the conditional expected utility of all future cash
ﬂows of the follower discounted to t ¼ s‘p is:
EPs‘p
Z sfp
s‘p
eqtUðrKÞdt þ
Z 1
sfp
eqtUðPtDð2ÞÞdt
" #
¼
Z 1
s‘p
eqtUðrKÞdt þ EPs‘p e
q sfps‘pð Þ
h i
Vfp Psfp
 
ð7Þ
where
Vfp Psfp
 
¼ EP
sfp
Z 1
0
eqt ½UðPtDð2ÞÞ  UðrKÞdt
 
ð8Þ
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to sfp,
and, like the monopoly case, the scope of the pre-emptive follower
is to maximise the discounted to s‘p expected utility of the project’s
cash ﬂows, i.e., EPs‘p
eq s
f
ps‘pð Þ
h i
Vfp Psfp
 
.Fig. 1. Discounted utility from investment under risk aversion for a monopoly.Next, the conditional expected utility of all future cash ﬂows of
the leader discounted to t ¼ s‘p is:
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
¼ EPs‘p
Z sfp
s‘p
eqt ½UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞdt þ
Z 1
sfp
eqt½UðPtDð2ÞÞ
"
UðrKÞdt
#
¼ Vjm Ps‘p
 
þ EPs‘p e
q sfps‘pð Þ
h i
EP
sfp

Z 1
0
eqt ½UðPtDð2ÞÞ  UðPtDð1ÞÞdt
 
ð9Þ
Notice that up to time sfp, the leader enjoys monopolistic proﬁts as
in (6), while after the entry of the follower the two ﬁrms share the
market, as illustrated in Fig. 2. This implies that, although up to time
sfp the leader is alone in the market, her value function does not cor-
respond to that of a monopolist since the future entry of the fol-
lower reduces the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts. This
reduction is reﬂected by the second term on the right-hand side
of (9), which is negative since Dð2Þ < Dð1Þ.
3.3.2. Non-pre-emptive duopoly
Here, the roles of the leader and the follower are deﬁned exog-
enously. Consequently, the future cash ﬂows of the leader are dis-
counted to time t ¼ 0. Since the follower will consider entry into
the market only when the leader has already invested, the future
cash ﬂows of the follower are discounted to s‘n, as illustrated in
Fig. 3.
The conditional expected utility of the follower’s cash ﬂows is
the same as in the pre-emptive case but discounted to t ¼ s‘n, i.e.,Z 1
s‘n
eqtUðrKÞdt þ EPs‘n e
q sfns‘nð Þ
h i
Vfn Psfn
 
ð10Þ
where VfnðÞ ¼ VfpðÞ and the objective of the follower is to maximise
EPs‘n
eq s
f
ns‘nð Þ
h i
Vfn Psfn
 
.
The leader now knows that she has the right to enter the market
ﬁrst and, therefore, does not run the risk of pre-emption. As a re-
sult, the expected utility of the leader’s future cash ﬂows dis-
counted to t ¼ 0 is:
EP0
Z s‘n
0
eqtUðrKÞdt þ
Z sfn
s‘n
eqtUðPtDð1ÞÞdt þ
Z 1
sfn
eqtUðPtDð2ÞÞdt
" #
¼
Z 1
0
eqtUðrKÞdt þ EP0 eqs
‘
n
h i
V ‘p Ps‘n
 
ð11Þ
where V ‘pðÞ is deﬁned as in (9). Here, the objective of the leader is to
maximise EP0 e
qs‘n
h i
V ‘p Ps‘n
 
.
4. Analytical results
4.1. Monopoly
In this case, there is a single ﬁrm in the market that contem-
plates investment without the fear of pre-emption from the entry
Fig. 3. Discounted utility from investment under risk aversion for a non-pre-emptive duopoly.
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investment until the output price hits the optimal threshold, Psjm ,
that will trigger investment. Hence, for P0 6 Psjm , (12) indicates
the value of the monopolist’s investment opportunity:
Fsjm ðP0Þ ¼ sup
sjm2S
EP0
Z 1
sjm
eqt UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞ½ dt
" #
¼ sup
sjm2S
EP0 e
qsjm
h i
Vjm Psjm
 
ð12Þ
Here, S denotes the collection of admissible stopping times of the
ﬁltration generated by the price process. Using Theorem 9.18 of
Karatzas and Shreve (1999) for the CRRA utility function in (3),
we ﬁnd that the expression in (6) can be simpliﬁed using the
following:
EP0
Z 1
0
eqtUðPtÞdt ¼ AUðP0Þ ð13Þ
where A ¼ b1b2qð1b1cÞð1b2cÞ > 0, and b1 > 1; b2 < 0 are the solutions
for x to the following quadratic equation:
1
2
r2xðx 1Þ þ lx q ¼ 0 ð14Þ
By using the fact that the expected discount factor is
EP0 e
qsjm
h i
¼ P0P
sjm
 b1
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 315) and applying
the strong Markov property along with the law of iterated expecta-
tions, (12) can be written as follows:
Fsjm ðP0Þ ¼ maxP
sjm
PP0
P0
Psjm
 !b1
Vjm Psjm
 
ð15Þ
Solving the unconstrained optimisation problem (15), we ob-
tain the optimal investment threshold, Psjm , for the monopolist:
Psjm
¼ rK
Dð1Þ
b2 þ c 1
b2
  1
1c
ð16Þ
Although the investment threshold is usually expressed in terms of
b1, it is more expedient to use b2 here (note that b1b2 ¼  2qr2).
According to (16), uncertainty and risk aversion drive a wedge be-
tween the optimal investment threshold and the amortised invest-
ment cost. Indeed, it can be shown that higher risk aversion
increases the required investment threshold by decreasing the ex-
pected utility of the investment’s payoff, while increased uncer-
tainty increases the investment threshold by increasing the value
of waiting (Chronopoulos et al., 2011). All proofs are in the
appendix.
Proposition 4.1. Uncertainty and risk aversion increase the optimal
investment threshold.4.2. Pre-emptive duopoly
We solve this dynamic game backward by ﬁrst assuming that
the leader has just entered the market. The value of the follower
at s‘p < s
f
p is indicated in (17):
Fsfp Ps‘p
 
¼ sup
sfpPs‘p
EPs‘p
eq s
f
ps‘pð Þ
h i
Vfp Psfp
 
¼ max
P
sfp
PPs‘p
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
Vfp Psfp
 
ð17Þ
Solving the unconstrained optimisation problem described by (17),
we obtain the optimal threshold, Psfp , that triggers the entry of the
follower:
Psfp ¼
rK
Dð2Þ
b2 þ c 1
b2
  1
1c
ð18Þ
Notice that sinceDð2Þ < Dð1Þ, we have Psfp > Psjm , i.e., the optimal en-
try threshold of the pre-emptive follower is higher than that of the
monopolist. Intuitively, this happens because the follower requires
compensation for losing the ﬁrst-mover advantage. After the critical
threshold, Psfp , is hit, the value of the follower is the discounted ex-
pected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, as indicated by (8).
Assuming that the follower chooses the optimal policy, the va-
lue function of the leader for Ps‘p 6 Pt < Psf p , i.e., when the leader is
alone in the market, is:
V ‘pðPtÞ ¼ EPt
Z sfp
0
eqt UðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞð Þdt þ
Z 1
sf

p
eqt UðPtDð2ÞÞð
"
UðrKÞÞdt
#
¼ AUðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞq þ
Pt
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp
 
 Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
h i
ð19Þ
For Pt P Psfp , the two ﬁrms share the market and, as a result, the va-
lue function of the leader is the same as the follower’s.
As we show in Proposition 4.2, the pre-emptive leader’s value
function is concave and, under a large discrepancy in market
share, there exists a ﬁnite output price at which the pre-emptive
leader’s value function is maximised. Otherwise, the pre-emptive
leader’s value function is strictly increasing. Intuitively, a higher
output price simultaneously increases the expected discounted
utility of cash ﬂows and facilitates the follower’s entry. With a
higher loss in market share, the impact of the latter effect
dominates.
Proposition 4.2. The value function of the pre-emptive leader is
concave, and its maximum value is obtained prior to the entry of the
pre-emptive follower provided that:
Fig. 4. Incremental change in pre-emptive leader’s instantaneous revenues due to
increased uncertainty.
648 M. Chronopoulos et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 236 (2014) 643–656Dð2Þ < Dð1Þ b1 þ c 1
b1
  1
1c
ð20Þ
In order to determine the leader’s optimal investment thresh-
old, we need to consider the strategic interactions between the lea-
der and the follower. Let Ps‘p denote the threshold price at which a
ﬁrm is indifferent between becoming a leader or a follower. Recall
that in the pre-emptive setting, both ﬁrms want to enter ﬁrst in or-
der to obtain the leader’s advantage. However, for Pt < Ps‘p , the fol-
lower has not entered the market, and a ﬁrm would be better off
being the follower since then V ‘pðPtÞ < Fsfp ðPtÞ, while for Pt > Ps‘p ,
a ﬁrm is better off being a leader since then V ‘pðPtÞ > Fsfp ðPtÞ. Hence,
it must be the case that V ‘p Ps‘p
 
¼ Fsfp Ps‘p
 
for entry, a condition
that is found numerically by solving the following equation:
AU Ps‘p Dð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
þ
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp
 
½Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
¼
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp Dð2Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
 
ð21Þ
Solving (21) for Ps‘p , we obtain the entry threshold of the leader that
denotes the output price at which a ﬁrm is indifferent between
becoming a leader or a follower. Indeed, as we show in Proposition
4.3, the optimal entry threshold of the pre-emptive leader is lower
than that of the monopolist. This happens because the risk of pre-
emption deprives the leader of the option to postpone investment,
thereby lowering the required investment threshold.
Proposition 4.3. The pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold is
lower than that of the monopolist.
Although increased risk aversion raises the required investment
threshold by decreasing the expected utility of the investment’s
payoff, the loss in the value of the leader due to the entry of the
follower, evaluated at Ps‘p , relative to that of the monopolist is
not affected by risk aversion. Intuitively, the value of the leader
at Ps‘p equals the value of the follower’s investment opportunity.
Since both the follower and the monopolist hold a single option
each to enter the market, increased risk aversion poses a propor-
tional decrease in the option value of the follower relative to the
monopolist.
Proposition 4.4. The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative to
the monopolist’s value of investment opportunity at the pre-emptive
leader’s optimal entry threshold price is unaffected by risk aversion.
We next investigate how this ratio changes with uncertainty. In
Fig. 4, the horizontal lines represent the utility of the instantaneous
revenues the leader receives over time under low uncertainty, r,
and under high uncertainty, r0. As we will illustrate numerically,
increased uncertainty raises the required entry threshold of the
follower by more than that of the leader. This results in the in-
crease of the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts, represented
by the shaded area of Fig. 4, since, under higher uncertainty, she
enjoys monopoly proﬁts for a longer time and the loss in the lea-
der’s expected utility due to the entry of the follower at a higher
price is not signiﬁcant enough to offset it. In fact, this result is en-
hanced when the discrepancy in market share is large, since the
greater Dð1Þ is, the greater the pre-emptive leader’s incentive to
invest will be since then the ﬁrst-mover advantages are greater.
Notice also that as greater uncertainty raises the required entry
threshold of the follower, the leader’s instantaneous revenues can-
not drop below the level corresponding to r for t P sf
0
p .Proposition 4.5. The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative
the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold
price diminishes with increasing uncertainty.4.3. Non-pre-emptive duopoly
In the non-pre-emptive setting, the roles of the leader and the
follower are deﬁned exogenously, and, as a result, both ﬁrms have
the option to delay their entry into the market as the risk of pre-
emption is eliminated. The follower’s value function and entry
threshold are unchanged from the pre-emptive case since she will
still enter the market considering that the leader is already there.
Hence, the follower’s value of investment opportunity at s‘n is:
Fsfn Ps‘n
 
¼ max
P
sfn
PPs‘n
Ps‘n
Psfn
 !b1
Vfn Psfn
 
ð22Þ
Since the non-pre-emptive leader has discretion over investment
timing, her value of investment opportunity is described by:
Fs‘nðP0Þ ¼ maxPs‘nPP0
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
AU Ps‘nDð1Þ
 
UðrKÞ
q
þ Ps‘n
Psfn
 !b1
AU Psfn
 24
 Dð2Þ1c Dð1Þ1c
h ii
ð23Þ
The solution to the optimisation problem (23) yields the optimal
entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader:
Ps‘n ¼
rK
Dð1Þ
b2 þ c 1
b2
  1
1c
ð24Þ
Notice that by delaying entry, the leader suffers from forgoing cash
ﬂows but beneﬁts from temporarily delaying the entry of the fol-
lower. At the same time, allowing the project to start at a higher
output price yields a higher expected NPV, but the leader enjoys
monopoly revenues for less time. As it is shown in the appendix,
the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost corresponding to the entry
of the follower cancel.
Proposition 4.6. The optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive
leader is the same as that of the monopolist.
After the leader has entered the market and prior to the entry of
the follower, i.e., for Ps‘n 6 Pt < Psf n , the leader receives monopolis-
tic proﬁts with expected utility described by (25):
AUðPtDð1ÞÞ  UðrKÞq þ
Pt
Psfn
 !b1
AU Psfn
 
½Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c ð25Þ
After the follower’s entry, i.e., for t P sfn, the two ﬁrms share the
industry, thereby making equal proﬁts, and their value is simply
the discounted expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows.
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would be the same as the monopolist’s if it were not for the poten-
tial entry of the follower that reduces the expected utility of the
leader’s proﬁts. However, the reduction in the leader’s value of
investment opportunity due to the potential entry of the follower
decreases with risk aversion. This happens because risk aversion
delays the entry of the follower, thereby reducing the expected loss
in the option value of the leader. Consequently, the relative dis-
crepancy between the leader’s value of investment opportunity
and the monopolist’s diminishes with increasing risk aversion,
thereby reducing the relative loss in the value of the non-pre-emp-
tive leader.
Proposition 4.7. The loss in the value of the investment opportunity
for the non-pre-emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist at the
pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold price decreases with risk
aversion.
According to Proposition 4.8, depending on the discrepancy in
market share, uncertainty may increase or decrease the relative
loss in the value of the investment opportunity for the non-pre-
emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist. Notice that the
value of the non-pre-emptive leader consists of the value of the
monopolistic investment opportunity and the expected loss in
project value due to the entry of the follower. Both of these compo-
nents increase with uncertainty; however, for the latter, the impact
of uncertainty becomes more profound as the discrepancy in mar-
ket share increases. A version of this result for a risk-neutral duop-
oly with sequential capacity investments is given in Siddiqui and
Takashima (2012).
Proposition 4.8. The loss in the non-pre-emptive leader’s value of
investment opportunity relative to the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive
leader’s optimal entry threshold price increases with uncertainty if:
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 b1
> e; e ’ 2:718 ð26Þ
In Fig. 5, the instantaneous revenues of the leader are repre-
sented by the solid line for low uncertainty, r, and by the broken
line for high uncertainty, r0. Here, unlike in the pre-emptive
setting, the leader has the option to delay entry into the market.
Notice that a high discrepancy in market share implies a greater
ﬁrst-mover advantage but leads to a greater loss in the value of
the leader upon the entry of the follower, which becomes more
profound with higher uncertainty. However, increased uncertainty
also raises the value of the leader’s investment opportunity, there-
by creating an opposing effect. According to Proposition 4.8, if the
discrepancy in market share is low, then the loss in the non-pre-
emptive leader’s value relative to the monopolist’s decreases with
uncertainty. This happens because although the incentive to delay
investment is more profound and increases the opportunity cost,
represented by the shaded area between s‘n and s‘
0
n in Fig. 5, theFig. 5. Incremental change in non-pre-emptive leader’s instantaneous revenues due to ihigher expected revenues offset the expected loss in market share
due to the follower’s entry. The opposite result is observed if the
discrepancy in market share is high, since then the impact of
uncertainty on the value of the investment opportunity is less pro-
nounced. Consequently, the increase in the leader’s expected reve-
nues from delaying investment is not signiﬁcant enough to offset
the expected loss due to the entry of the follower. Hence, as the im-
pact of uncertainty on the loss in project value is more profound,
the non-pre-emptive leader becomes worse off.5. Numerical results
5.1. Pre-emptive duopoly
In order to examine the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty
on the entry of the pre-emptive leader and follower, we assume the
following parameter values: c 2 ½0;1Þ, r 2 ½0:1;0:5, l ¼ 0:01,
r ¼ q ¼ 0:04, K ¼ $100, Dð0Þ ¼ 0, Dð1Þ ¼ 1:5 or 3, and Dð2Þ ¼ 1.
Although it would be interesting to calibrate these to real data,
here, we are primarily concerned with illustrating analytical in-
sights via hypothetical parameters. Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of
uncertainty on the value of the pre-emptive leader and follower
under risk aversion. First, we observe that the leader’s entry
threshold is lower than the monopolist’s, which illustrates Propo-
sition 4.3. This happens due to pre-emption since the leader does
not have the option to defer investment, and, as a result, the risk
of pre-emption reduces the required investment threshold. On
the other hand, the required investment threshold of the pre-emp-
tive follower is higher than that of the monopolist since the former
requires compensation for losing the ﬁrst-mover advantage.
According to the graph on the right, uncertainty increases the value
of waiting, thereby raising the required investment threshold and
delaying the entry of the follower. This, in turn, increases the time
interval in which the leader enjoys monopoly proﬁts and dimin-
ishes the relative discrepancy between the value of the pre-emp-
tive leader and that of the monopolist.
Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of risk aversion on the value of the
pre-emptive leader and follower. According to the graph on the
right, increased risk aversion reduces the expected utility of the
investment’s payoff for both the leader and the monopolist, there-
by raising their required investment thresholds. Furthermore, it
seems that the impact of risk aversion on the pre-emptive leader’s
value is greater than on the follower’s value. Consequently, the two
curves intersect at a higher output price, thereby indicating that
the output price at which a ﬁrm is indifferent between becoming
a leader or a follower increases with higher risk aversion.
5.2. Non-pre-emptive duopoly
In the non-pre-emptive duopoly, the roles of the leader and the
follower are pre-assigned, and, as a result, both ﬁrms have thencreased uncertainty under low (left) and high (right) discrepancy in market share.
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Fig. 6. Project and investment opportunity value of monopolist, pre-emptive leader, and follower for r ¼ 0:2 (left) and r ¼ 0:4 (right) under risk aversion ðc ¼ 0:2Þ for
Dð1Þ ¼ 3.
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Fig. 7. Investment opportunity and project value of monopolist, pre-emptive leader, and follower under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion (c ¼ 0:5) (right) for r ¼ 0:4 and
Dð1Þ ¼ 3.
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the optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive follower is the
same as in the pre-emptive case since the follower will still enter
the market considering that the leader has already invested. Notice
also that the optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive lea-
der is the same as the monopolist’s, and, as a result, the required
investment threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader is higher than
that in the pre-emptive setting. This illustrates Proposition 4.3.
Although the optimal entry threshold is the same for the monopo-
list and non-pre-emptive leader, the investment opportunity value
of the latter is lower than that of the former since the potential en-
try of the follower reduces the expected utility of the leader’s prof-
its. As the graph on the right illustrates, increased uncertainty
raises the value of waiting, which, in turn, postpones investment
in all cases, thereby increasing the required investment thresholds.
Fig. 9 illustrates the impact of risk aversion on the optimal entry
thresholds of the monopolist and the non-pre-emptive leader and
follower. As indicated in the graphs, higher risk aversion reducesthe expected utility of the investment’s payoff in all cases, thereby
raising the required investment thresholds.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
As the left panel in Fig. 10 illustrates, all entry thresholds in-
crease with volatility as greater uncertainty implies greater value
of waiting and are higher with risk aversion as it delays investment
both for the leader and the follower by decreasing the expected
utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, which illustrates Proposition
4.1. Proposition 4.6 is illustrated by the fact that the leader’s
optimal investment threshold is the same as the monopolist’s.
Also, higher ﬁrst-mover advantages represented by greater Dð1Þ
result in the decrease of the required entry thresholds of the pre-
emptive and non-pre-emptive leader as illustrated in the graph
on the right.
In order to compare the pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive
leader’s values to the monopolist’s, we evaluate both at the
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Fig. 8. Project and investment opportunity value for non-pre-emptive leader and follower for r ¼ 0:2 (left) and r ¼ 0:4 (right) under risk aversion (c ¼ 0:2) for Dð1Þ ¼ 3.
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to the graph on the left in Fig. 11, increased uncertainty diminishes
the relative loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value function, i.e.,
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
 V ‘p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ð27Þ
thereby reducing the discrepancy between the pre-emptive leader’s
value and the monopolist’s value of investment opportunity. This
happens because uncertainty postpones the entry of the follower,
thus allowing the pre-emptive leader to enjoy monopoly proﬁts
longer, which illustrates Proposition 4.5. Notice that the impact of
uncertainty is more profound when the discrepancy in market share
is low since then the expected loss due to the follower’s entry is
smaller.
Uncertainty decreases the relative loss in the non-pre-emptive
leader’s value of investment opportunity, i.e.,
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
 Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ð28Þif the discrepancy in market share is small, i.e., Dð1ÞDð2Þ
 b1
< e, as in the
graph on the left. Intuitively, this happens because under low dis-
crepancy in market share, the increase in the non-pre-emptive lea-
der’s value of investment opportunity due to increased uncertainty
is greater than the expected loss due to the entry of the follower.
However, if the discrepancy is high, then the increase in option va-
lue is less profound with higher uncertainty due to higher ﬁrst-
mover advantages and, as a result, cannot offset the expected loss
from the follower’s entry, which is now greater. This illustrates
Proposition 4.8.
Furthermore, risk aversion does not affect the relative loss in
the value of the leader for the pre-emptive duopoly setting, as
in Proposition 4.4, but it makes the loss in value relatively less
for the leader in a non-pre-emptive duopoly setting due to de-
layed entry of the follower, which illustrates Proposition 4.7. No-
tice that at Ps‘p , the value function of the pre-emptive leader is
the same as the option value of the pre-emptive follower. As a
result, the impact of risk aversion on the value of the pre-emp-
tive leader at Ps‘p is the same as that on the value of the fol-
lower’s investment opportunity at the same output price. Since
the follower’s investment opportunity value differs from the
monopolist’s only with respect to the market share, risk aversion
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proportionally.6. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a utility-based framework in order to
examine the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on the opti-
mal investment timing decisions of a ﬁrm that faces competition.
The analysis is motivated both by the increasing competition
resulting from the deregulation of many sectors of the economy
such as energy and telecommunications, as well as the fact that
attitudes towards the undiversiﬁable risk arising from the develop-
ment of new products may impact investment decisions of a ﬁrm.
The combination of these two factors creates the need to incorpo-
rate risk aversion into the real options framework in order to ana-
lyse strategic aspects of decision making under uncertainty. In the
context of our motivating example concerning renewable energy
technologies, the nature of industry competition and the degree
of risk aversion due to the presence of technical risk could shape
the pathway to decarbonisation in unexpected ways.We ﬁnd that, under the fear of pre-emption, higher uncertainty
reduces the relative loss in the value of the leader due to competi-
tion by delaying the entry of the follower. However, in the non-
pre-emptive setting, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous and
depends on the discrepancy in market share. If the discrepancy is
high, then the non-pre-emptive leader’s relative loss in value in-
creases with uncertainty since the impact of the follower’s entry
is more profound and offsets the increase in the leader’s value of
investment opportunity. By contrast, under low discrepancy in
market share, higher uncertainty makes the non-pre-emptive
leader better off as the increase in the value of investment
opportunity is greater than the expected loss in value due to
competition. Interestingly, the relative loss in the pre-emptive lea-
der’s value is not affected by risk aversion, while the non-pre-emp-
tive leader becomes better off with greater risk aversion as it
delays the entry of the follower. Hence, regulators may have to
think more carefully about energy policy and market design in
guiding an energy transition due to the subtle effects of such sali-
ent features.
This work considers the case where the two competing ﬁrms
exhibit the same level of risk aversion. Consequently, a potential
M. Chronopoulos et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 236 (2014) 643–656 653extension is to relax this assumption and to investigate a case with
different levels of risk aversion for each ﬁrm. Directions for future
research may also include the application of a different stochastic
process, e.g., arithmetic Brownian motion, or the study of other as-
pects of the real options literature, such as the time to build or
capacity sizing, under the same framework. Finally, we may allow
for operational ﬂexibility via suspension and resumption options,
as this may reduce the incentive to delay investment under high
risk aversion, as indicated by Chronopoulos et al. (2011).
Acknowledgement
The authors are grateful for feedback from attendees of the
2010 INFORMS Annual Meeting (Austin, TX, USA), the 2011
Annual Real Options Conference (Turku, Finland), and a seminar
at the Faculty of Commerce of Doshisha University (Kyoto,
Japan). Siddiqui thanks the ELDEV project in Trondheim, Norway
for support. Comments from two anonymous reviewers have
helped to improve this work. All remaining errors are the
authors’ own.
Appendix AProposition 4.1. Uncertainty and risk aversion increase the optimal
investment threshold.Proof. See Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in Chronopoulos et al.
(2011). hProposition 4.2. The value function of the pre-emptive leader is con-
cave and its maximum value is obtained prior to the entry of the pre-
emptive follower provided that:
Dð2Þ < Dð1Þ b1 þ c 1
b1
  1
1c
ð29ÞProof. The value of the pre-emptive leader is:
V ‘pðPtÞ ¼ AUðPtDð1ÞÞ 
UðrKÞ
q
þ Pt
Psfp
 !b1
AUðPsfp Þ Dð2Þ
1c  Dð1Þ1c
h i
ð30Þ
Differentiating (30) with respect to Pt we have:
@V ‘pðPtÞ
@Pt
¼ ADð1Þ1cPct þ b1
Pt
Psfp
 !b1
 1
Pt
AUðPsfp Þ Dð2Þ
1c  Dð1Þ1c
h i
ð31Þ
Hence,
@V ‘pðPtÞ
@Pt
¼ 0) Pt ¼ Psfp
b1
1 c 1
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 1c" #" # 11b1c
ð32Þ
Notice that 11b1c < 0. Hence, for (32) to be valid we must have:
1 Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 1c
> 0() Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 1c
< 1() Dð2Þ < Dð1Þ ð33Þ
which is true. In order to show that the value of the pre-emptive
leader obtains a maximum, we partially differentiate (31) with re-
spect to Pt .@2V ‘pðPtÞ
@P2t
¼ cADð1Þ
1c
Pcþ1t
þ b1ðb1  1ÞPb12t
1
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp
 
 Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
h i
ð34Þ
As both terms in (34) are negative, we have @
2V‘pðPt Þ
@P2t
< 0 8Pt 2
Ps‘p ; Psfp
h 
. Finally, we will derive the condition under which the
output price at which V ‘pðPtÞ becomes maximised is lower than
the optimal entry threshold of the follower:
b1
1 c 1
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 1c" #" # 1b1þc1
> 1() Dð2Þ
<
b1 þ c 1
b1
  1
1c
Dð1Þ ð35Þ
Notice that b1þc1b1 < 1 implies that, in order for the value function of
the pre-emptive leader to decrease prior to the entry of the fol-
lower, the discrepancy in market share must be signiﬁcantly
large. hProposition 4.3. The pre-emptive leader’s entry threshold is lower
than that of the monopolist.Proof. First, notice that the follower’s value of investment oppor-
tunity is:
Fsfp ðPtÞ ¼
Pt
Psfp
 !b1
Vfp Psfp
 
)
@Fsfp ðPtÞ
@Pt
¼ b1Pb11t
1
Psfp
 !b1
Vfp Psfp
 
> 0; 8Pt 2 Ps‘p ; Psfp
h 
)
@2Fsfp ðPtÞ
@P2t
¼ b1ðb1  1ÞPb12t
1
Psfp
 !b1
Vfp Psfp
 
> 0; 8Pt 2 Ps‘p ; Psfp
h 
ð36Þ
Thus, the value of the follower’s investment opportunity is convex
and strictly increasing from zero. Second, from Proposition 4.2, we
know that the pre-emptive leader’s value function is strictly
concave in Pt starting from a negative value. Consequently, for
Pt < Psfp the two value functions intersect at most once. In order
to show that the pre-emptive leader’s entry threshold is lower than
that of the monopolist, we will evaluate the pre-emptive leader’s
value and the pre-emptive follower’s value of investment opportu-
nity at the monopolist’s entry threshold. The objective is to prove
that at the monopolist’s optimal entry threshold, the value of the
pre-emptive leader is greater than the value of the pre-emptive fol-
lower’s investment opportunity, i.e.,
AU PsjmDð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
þ
Psjm
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp Dð2Þ
 
AU Psfp Dð1Þ
 h i
>
Psjm
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp Dð2Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
 
ð37Þ
Substituting for Psjm and Psf

p
we have:
ð1 cÞ Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 b1
 b1
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
> 1 b1  c ð38Þ
654 M. Chronopoulos et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 236 (2014) 643–656The last inequality can be written as b aþ axb  bxa > 0 where
a ¼ 1 c < 1, b ¼ b1 > 1, and x ¼ Dð1ÞDð2Þ > 1. Since b a ¼ b1 þ c
1 > 0, in order to show (38), we need to show that
axb  bxa > 0. For this reason, let f ðxÞ ¼ axb  bxa; x > 1. Notice that
since f 0ðxÞ > 0 and f 00ðxÞ > 0; f ðxÞ is increasing and convex. Also,
f 0ðxÞ ¼ 0) x ¼ 1 and f ð1Þ ¼ 0. Thus, f ðxÞ > f ð1Þ ¼ 0)
axb  bxa > 0; 8 x > 1. Therefore, at the entry threshold of the
monopolist, the value function of the pre-emptive leader is greater
than the follower’s value of investment opportunity. Notice also
that Pt ! 0) V ‘pðPtÞ < Fsfp ðPtÞ. Since, according to Proposition 4.2,
the maximum that the value of the pre-emptive leader can obtain
in Ps‘p ; Psfp
h 
is global, this implies that, 8Pt : Pt < Psjm ;9 at most
one price Ps‘p : Fsfp ¼ V
‘
p. Hence, we conclude that Ps‘p < Psjm . hProposition 4.4. The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative to
the monopolist’s value of investment opportunity at the pre-emptive
leader’s optimal entry threshold price is unaffected by risk aversion.Proof. In order to show that the relative loss in value is unaffected
by risk aversion, we consider the following ratio:
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ð39Þ
Notice that Fsjm ð Þ is given by (12), which we re-write here for
P0 ¼ Ps‘p :
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
¼
Ps‘p
Psjm
 !b1
AU PsjmDð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
 
ð40Þ
Similarly, the expression for V ‘p ð Þ evaluated at Ps‘p is given by:
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
¼ AU Ps‘p Dð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
þ
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp
 
Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
 
ð41Þ
Notice also that for Ps‘p , the equality V
‘
pðPs‘p Þ ¼ Fsfp ðPs‘p Þ holds, i.e.:
AU Ps‘p Dð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
þ
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp
 
Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
 
¼
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
AU Psfp Dð2Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
 
ð42Þ
Substituting the expressions for Ps‘p and Psjm from (16) and (18) into
(40) and (42), respectively, we have:
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
¼
Ps‘p
Psjm
 !b1
1 c
b1 þ c 1
 
UðrKÞ
q
ð43Þ
and
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
¼
Ps‘p
Psfp
 !b1
1 c
b1 þ c 1
 
UðrKÞ
q
ð44Þ
By cancelling the Ps‘p term and substituting for Psjm and Psf

p
, we
have:
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1
ð45ÞAs a result, the relative loss in the value of the pre-emptive leader is
constant and, for this reason, is unaffected by risk aversion. hProposition 4.5. The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative to
the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold
price diminishes with increasing uncertainty.Proof. According to (45), the relative value of the pre-emptive lea-
der compared to that of a monopolist is:
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ V
‘
p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1
ð46Þ
Partially differentiating (46) with respect to r, we have:
@
@r
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1
¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1
ln
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 
@b1
@r
ð47Þ
Notice that since @b1
@r < 0 and ln
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 
< 0, we have:
@
@r
V ‘p Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
2
4
3
5 > 0 ð48Þ
This implies that with increasing uncertainty, the loss in the value
of the pre-emptive leader relative to the monopolist’s
diminishes. hProposition 4.6. The optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive
leader is the same as that of the monopolist.Proof. Given the initial output price, P0, and assuming that the fol-
lower has chosen the optimal policy, the non-pre-emptive leader’s
entry problem is described by (49):
Fs‘nðP0Þ ¼ sup
s‘nPP0
EP0 e
qs‘n
h i
V ‘p Ps‘n
 
ð49Þ
where
V ‘p Ps‘n
 
¼ Vjm Ps‘n
 
þ EPs‘n e
q sfp s‘n
 	 
EP
sf

p
Z 1
0
eqt UðPtDð2ÞÞ  UðPtDð1ÞÞ½ dt
 
ð50Þ
Hence, (49) may be rewritten as:
Fs‘nðP0Þ¼ maxPs‘nPP0
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
Vjm Ps‘n
 
þ Ps‘n
Psfn
 !b1
EP
sf

p
Z 1
0
eqt UðPtDð2ÞÞ½
24
UðPtDð1ÞÞ
#
dt
##
ð51Þ
The FONC for the optimisation problem (52) is:
@Fs‘nðP0Þ
@Ps‘n
¼ b1
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
 1
Ps‘n
 !
Vjm Ps‘n
 
þ P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
@
@Ps‘n
Vjm Ps‘n
 
þ b1
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
 1
Ps‘n
 !
Ps‘n
Psfn
 !b1
EP
sf

p
Z 1
0
eqt UðPtDð2ÞÞ½

UðPtDð1ÞÞdt
#
þ b1
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1 Ps‘n
Psfn
 !b1
1
Ps‘n
 !
EP
sf

p

Z 1
0
eqt ½UðPtDð2ÞÞ  UðPtDð1ÞÞdt
 
ð52Þ
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ment, which postpones the entry of the follower, while the fourth
term reﬂects the marginal cost from enjoying monopoly proﬁts
for less time. Since the last two lines in (52) cancel, we have:
@Fs‘n ðP0Þ
@Ps‘n
¼ b1
P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
 1
Ps‘n
 !
Vjm Ps‘n
 
þ P0
Ps‘n
 !b1
 @
@Ps‘n
V jm Ps‘n
 
ð53Þ
The monopolist’s optimisation problem is:
Fsjm ðP0Þ ¼ sup
sjm2S
EP0 e
qsjm
h i
Vjm Psjm
 
ð54Þ
and the corresponding FONC is:
@Fsjm ðP0Þ
@Psjm
¼ b1
P0
Psjm
 !b1
 1
Psjm
 !
Vjm Psjm
 
þ P0
Psjm
 !b1

@Vjm Psjm
 
@Psjm
ð55Þ
Comparing (53) and (55), we conclude that the optimal entry
threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader is the same as that of
the monopolist, which for the special case of a CRRA utility func-
tion is:
Ps‘n ¼
rK
Dð1Þ
b2 þ c 1
b2
  1
1c
 ð56ÞProposition 4.7. The loss in the value of the investment opportunity
for the non-pre-emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist at the
pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold price decreases with risk
aversion.Proof. The relative loss in the non-pre-emptive leader’s value is:
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
 Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ 1 Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ð57Þ
Recall that prior to investment, the non-pre-emptive leader’s value
of investment opportunity at Ps‘p is:
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
¼
Ps‘p
Ps‘n
 !b1
AU Ps‘n Dð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
þ Ps‘

n
Psfn
 !b124
 A
P1c
sf

n
1 c Dð2Þ
1c  Dð1Þ1c
 24
3
5
3
5 ð58Þ
Notice that the expression of the monopolist’s value of investment
opportunity, Fsjm ð Þ, evaluated at Ps‘p is given by (59):
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
¼
Ps‘p
Psjm
 !b1
AU PsjmDð1Þ
 
 UðrKÞ
q
 
ð59Þ
Hence,
1
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ 
Ps‘p
Ps‘n
 b1 Ps‘n
P
sf

n
 b1
AP1c
sf

n
Dð2Þ1c  Dð1Þ1c
  
Ps‘p
P
sj

m
 !b1
A PsjmDð1Þ
 1c
 ðrKÞ1cq
 
¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1 b1
1 c
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
 1
" #
ð60ÞPartially differentiating (57) with respect to c yields:
@
@c
1
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

n
 
2
4
3
5 ¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1
 b1
1 c
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
 1
1 c 
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
ln
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
8><
>:
9>=
>;
ð61Þ
According to (61),
@
@c
1
Fs‘n Ps‘n
 
Fsjm Ps‘

n
 
2
4
3
5 6 0
() Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
 1 Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
ln
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
6 0 ð62Þ
Setting x ¼ Dð1ÞDð2Þ
 1c
> 0) x 1 x ln x 6 0()  ln 1x P 1 1x.
Setting 1x ¼ y)  ln yP 1 y() ln y 6 y 1 which is true. hProposition 4.8. The loss in the non-pre-emptive leader’s value of
investment opportunity relative to the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive
leader’s optimal entry threshold price increases with uncertainty if:
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 b1
> eProof. According to (60), the relative loss in option value of the
non-pre-emptive leader is:
1
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
  ¼ Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1 b1
1 c
Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
 1
" #
ð63Þ
Partially differentiating with respect to r we have:
@
@r
1
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
2
4
3
5 ¼ Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 1c
 1
" #
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 b1 @b1
@r
1 cþ
@b1
@r
ln
(
 Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
 
b1
1 c


ð64Þ
Hence,
@
@r
1
Fs‘n Ps‘p
 
Fsjm Ps‘

p
 
2
4
3
5 > 0() @b1@r
1 cþ
@b1
@r
ln
Dð2Þ
Dð1Þ
b1
1 c
> 0() Dð1Þ
Dð2Þ
 b1
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